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Abstract. Managing non-profit organizations (NPOs) in developing countries constitutes a 
challenge due to the intrinsic hardship of their missions, and the pressure of balancing their 
stakeholder’s interests and needs. Beyond the explicit challenges NPOs face (e.g., attracting 
volunteers, retaining employees, accounting to donors), we tackle the implicit obligations and 
returns that volunteers, employees, and donors hold towards an NPO. By introducing the 
concept of Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPC) and its three currencies (relational, 
transactional and ideological), we identify how each creates value for these stakeholders in a 
different way, using data from 409 respondents, representing 7 Bolivian NPOs. Despite the 
high levels of satisfaction and engagement among respondents, currencies such as 
Transactional Obligations in volunteers or Relational Returns in donors did not create 
substantial value. As predicted, Ideological returns showed relevance for all groups. 
However, in the case of employees, this currency shows a negative impact on satisfaction 
with the NPO, and engagement with the cause has no influence on their turnover intentions, 
as only satisfaction with the organization mediates in their intention to quit. We conclude that 
SPCs are a valuable concept for NPO managers when it comes to triggering engagement and 
satisfaction for each stakeholder group. 
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Contratos Psicológicos de Actores: El valor de las expectativas implícitas 
en OSFLs bolivianas 
 
Resumen. La gerencia de organizaciones sin fines de lucro (OSFL) en países en vías de 
desarrollo es un reto debido a la dureza intrínseca de su misión y debido a la presión en el 
equilibrio de los intereses de sus actores. Más allá de los retos extrínsecos (e.g. reclutamiento 
de voluntarios, retención de empleados y rendición de cuentas), nos referimos a las 
obligaciones y retornos intrínsecos que voluntarios, empleados y donadores tienen hacia la 
OSFL. Al introducir el concepto de Contrato Psicológico de Actores (CPA) y sus tres 
monedas (relacional, transaccional e ideológica), identificamos cómo cada una de ellas 
genera valor para estos actores clave de manera particular, utilizando datos de 409 
participantes que representan 7 OSFLs bolivianas. A pesar de los altos niveles de satisfacción 
y compromiso en los participantes, monedas como las Obligaciones Transaccionales en 
voluntarios o los Retornos Relacionales en donantes demostraron no crear valor significativo. 
De acuerdo con lo anticipado, Retornos Ideológicos demostraron relevancia para todos los 
grupos. En el caso de los empleados, esta moneda indica un impacto negativo en satisfacción 
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hacia la OSFL, y el compromiso con la causa no tiene influencia alguna en sus intenciones de 
renuncia, es únicamente la satisfacción con la organización que actúa como mediador en este 
caso. Concluimos en que el CPA es un concepto valioso para las gerencias de OSFL al 
momento de generar compromiso y satisfacción para cada grupo de actores. 
 
Palabras clave: Gerencia de actores claves, contrato psicológico, organizaciones sin fines 
de lucro, Bolivia.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2010, Bolivia is no longer considered a low-income country (World Bank, 2017). 
This evolution has led to decreasing international funding for Nonprofit Organizations 
(NPOs), and therefore, to increasing challenges. While the sector has long benefited from 
international aid, funds were often misused or used unsustainably (Barber & Bowie, 2008). 
New government directives further state that all cooperation funds entering the country be 
controlled for political intentions (García Linera, 2015), leading to a crowding-out of 
cooperation and funding agencies. Despite its economic growth, 36% of the Bolivian 
population remains below the poverty line (World Bank, 2017). Hence, NPOs are still 
prevailing in the country in order to counteract the effects of income inequality and low 
access to education in vulnerable populations. In order to sustain their efforts, NPOs compete 
not only for international funding but also for citizens’ donations, for qualified staff and 
engaged volunteers, under increasing scrutiny of government and society. 
These challenges and potential solutions have been documented, from NPOs showing 
their impact in society (Mook, Maiorano, Ryan, Armstrong, & Quarter, 2015), to increasing 
their accountability practices (Cavill & Sohail, 2007) and recruiting the right people in 
competitive environments (Barber & Bowie, 2008). Most of these challenges are addressed 
from a stakeholder management perspective, as NPOs need to satisfy each stakeholder’s 
expectations (Balser & McClusky, 2005) and stakeholders need a differentiated treatment 
from NPOs towards realizing engagement. Recent literature has focused on the value that 
emerges from collaboration with other stakeholders such as volunteers (Kaltenbrunner & 
Renzl, 2019) or with other types of organizations (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). However, there 
is little focus on what value creation exactly means for stakeholders, especially in southern or 
developing countries.  
In this article, we study the expectations of three important stakeholders (volunteers, 
employees and donors) in the Bolivian nonprofit environment, by using the recently 
introduced concept of the stakeholder-psychological contract or SPC (Brown, Buchholtz, & 
Dunn, 2016). SPCs allows comparing implicit obligations and returns, which may prompt 
stakeholder satisfaction with the NPO as well as engagement with a cause. By introducing the 
SPC concept, we are able to unravel the concept of value into three main currencies, where 
value is obtained and exchanged in stakeholder relationships.  
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Brown, Buchholtz, and Dunn (2016) are the first to take the relational and transactional 
currencies as defined by Rousseau (1989) to a firm-stakeholder level. We adapt this to the 
nonprofit environment and add the ideological component developed by Bingham (2005) and 
studied mainly in volunteer or employment contexts (e.g., Vantilborgh et al., 2014). 
Together, these three aspects can be applied to stakeholder relationships, where the 
contribution to a cause is key for the relationship. The implications of our research are 
significant for NPO managers, as they will better understand which currencies are more likely 
to create value for certain groups of stakeholders.  
In sum, the main objective of this paper is to adapt the concept of psychological 
contracts to a stakeholder perspective, enabling a formal comparison of stakeholders’ implicit 
obligations and returns to an NPO, and determining the salience that emerges from different 
currencies or expectations. By addressing volunteers, employees and donors, we contribute to 
stakeholder theory by providing a managerial instrument for acknowledging stakeholders’ 
expectations, we also contribute to psychological contract theory by expanding its application 
beyond the employee-employer relationship.  
 
2. Stakeholder Management in NPOs 
 
Stakeholder theory stresses the need for managerial attention to all stakeholders in a 
balanced way to achieve sustainable organizational success. Freeman (1984) posits that 
stakeholder management is the only way to sustainability, through integrating partners’ 
interests in strategic decision-making.  
In stakeholder theory, successful relationships exist when all parties provide value for 
all stakeholders, rather than taking advantage of one group to favor another (Freeman & 
McVea, 2001). Value creation for stakeholders occurs when all parties in a relationship are 
better off (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007), with each stakeholder judging what makes 
them better off. In this context, the value within stakeholder relationships can be diverse and 
particular, but it may also be implicit, and value will be as subjective and idiosyncratic as the 
relationship itself (Sacconi, 2006).  
Making stakeholder relationships the main unit of analysis provides great opportunities 
as it allows us to analyze the terms of a relationship and the role of each stakeholder in it. 
Given that NPO stakeholders hold diverse interests in the organization, they generate 
managerial challenges for the NPO (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). For instance, governments tend 
to have great power, as they set the regulatory context and can easily influence the fulfillment 
of NPOs’ missions. Financers can impose certain expenses or overheads (Candler, 2010); and 
while beneficiaries should receive most of the attention, we often find unattended groups of 
stakeholders such as volunteers and employees, not having sufficient leverage with the 
organization to improve their working conditions. Recent literature has emphasized volunteer 
management as a highly relevant challenge for NPOs (Vantilborgh & Puyvelde, 2018), but 
studies regarding the balancing of needs of both employees and volunteers are scarce, as are 
comparisons between multiple stakeholders (e.g., Liao-Troth, 2005). 
According to Balser and McClusky (2005), NPOs need to be responsive to their 
stakeholders and act according to the stakeholders’ expectations to be effective. This 
responsiveness becomes problematic when expectations are conflicting, unaligned or unclear, 
in particular when it concerns beneficiaries' objectives versus less powerful, but equally 
legitimate, stakeholder objectives (Ebrahim, 2005). This confirms the need for an instrument 
that translates stakeholder’s expectations and helps NPO managers understand stakeholders, 
in terms of specific sources of value creation. 
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3. Stakeholder Psychological Contracts 
 
Psychological contracts (PCs) have been widely studied to describe employees’ 
expectations towards their employer in a wide array of employment relationships (Cavanaugh 
& Noe, 1999; Dainty, Raiden, & Neale, 2004; Dries, Forrier, De Vos, & Pepermans, 2014; 
Rousseau, 1995). Most recently in nonprofit environments, PCs have been used to gain a 
better understanding of volunteers’ motivations and their perceptions towards an organization 
(Nichols, 2013; Vantilborgh, 2015).  
Rousseau (1989) defined PCs as the expectations and beliefs employees hold regarding 
the terms of their relationship with their employer and the obligations the employer owes in 
return. Fulfilled PCs have shown positive correlations with affect (Aranda, Hurtado, & Topa, 
2018; Vantilborgh, Bidee, Pepermans, Griep, & Hofmans, 2016), job satisfaction (Robinson 
& Rousseau, 1994), increased performance (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Millward & 
Hopkins, 1998), work engagement (Soares & Mosquera, 2019), trust (Atkinson, 2007) and 
reduced turnover intention (Collins, 2010), while breached or unfulfilled PCs are associated 
with reduced commitment and engagement (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000), aggressive and 
decreased considerate voice (Vantilborgh, 2015), among other negative behaviors. 
However useful the PC has proven to be, most of the literature focuses on the 
employee-employer relationship, where the employee’s expectations are either described 
(Festing & Schäfer, 2014; Ho, Rousseau, & Levesque, 2006; Rousseau, 2000), fulfilled 
(Morrison & Robinson, 1997) or breached (Antonaki & Trivellas, 2014). Some authors have 
emphasized the need to explore further types of employment relationships (Herriot & 
Pemberton, 1997) even considering “there are as many contracts as there are relationships 
within the workplace” (Marks, 2001, p. 456). And although not all NPOs use volunteers as a 
resource, some are highly reliant on volunteer work at grassroots levels of the organization 
(Wellens & Jegers, 2014).  
The application of PC theory outside the employee-employer relationship is not entirely 
novel, as it has been extended to describe customer-supplier relationships (Koh, Ang, & 
Straub, 2004; Pavlou & Gefen, 2005). The term “firm-stakeholder psychological contracts” is 
used to create a moral salient framework for trust repair between a firm and a stakeholder 
when some misconduct has taken place (Brown et al., 2016). This last approach applies the 
relational and transactional currencies in order to describe when stakeholder relationships can 
be easier to mend.  
Using PC theory to analyze stakeholder relationships increases the opportunity for 
meaningful stakeholder management. As managers think about retributing their stakeholders, 
they may reflect on all possible currencies that will be valuable for stakeholders (Freeman, 
1984). We, therefore, define Stakeholder Psychological Contracts (SPCs) as the perceived 
expectations stakeholders hold towards an organization, considering the obligations and 
returns that arise from the reciprocity of the relationship. Consistent with PC theory, SPC 
currencies exchanged among stakeholders can be divided into Relational, Transactional and 
Ideological. 
The relational currency is associated with behavior or actions beyond written 
requirements, where arrangements are based upon mutual trust and loyalty and rewards are 
not necessarily conditioned to performance. Loyalty, stability and an open-ended time frame 
are the main characteristics (Rousseau, 1995, 2000). From this perspective, resources are 
provided freely and reciprocated over time; resources and capabilities are developed and 
shared between parties with high involvement and continuity in order to achieve the full 
potential of the relationship (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012). 
The transactional currency focuses on economic exchange and limited involvement, 
whether in a specific time frame or limiting duties and tasks. The possibility of written 
 Gobernar, 3 (5) July-December // Julio-Diciembre, 2019: 17-42 (ISSN: 2474-2678)                                             
 
21 
agreements with specific contributions is part of this currency. Contributions will be limited 
to what stakeholders will receive in return for their input in the short term. Hence, 
stakeholders such as funders may earn tax exemptions, volunteers receive contribution 
certificates and employees receive compensations (Wellens & Jegers, 2014). 
We find the ideological currency particularly relevant for NPOs since it concerns the 
sponsoring of a cause or being committed to a mission above all else. This also includes 
involving other stakeholders in the cause in order to multiply its effects (Bingham, 2005). 
Ideological contracting can elicit further contributions from stakeholders that strengthen the 
relationship and create stronger bonds.  
 
4. Hypotheses 
 
Stakeholders hold varied motivations to engage with NPOs, therefore they may find 
value in one or more currencies of the SPC. Our first hypothesis addresses the general 
composition of SPCs for each group under consideration. According to social exchange 
theory, behaviors that are reciprocated by another party are sustained over time; according to 
Thacker (2015), in a working environment, when employees provide time and effort, they can 
be reciprocated with a paycheck, job security, and recognition. Contrary to this, Knutsen and 
Chan (2015) indicate that the nature of volunteer work is providing ‘something’ and 
expecting ‘nothing’ in return, thereby finding satisfaction in their obligations. However, they 
may expect other currencies above the monetary such as friendship, experience, etc. 
(Vantilborgh et al., 2011a). Meanwhile, donors delegate decision making to the NPO, where 
the latter becomes responsible for the outcome of the transaction, and therefore highly 
accountable for the results (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2012; Wellens & 
Jegers, 2014) making the donor highly expectant.  
We state that, independently of the nature of the relationship, volunteers, employees, 
and donors engage in economic exchange, even though they may not exchange the same 
currencies. According to SPC, relationships are based on reciprocity and balance, therefore 
we expect to find it in stakeholders’ perceived Obligations and Returns. 
 
o  H1. The composition of SPCs: The SPC of each stakeholder group (volunteers, 
employees, donors) will not show significant differences when comparing their 
individual Returns and Obligations. 
 
We insist that in order to sustain a stakeholder relationship both the stakeholder and the 
organization are receiving valuable outcomes. If one of the parties expects more returns than 
obligations, they may be destroying value for themselves. While if they have too high 
obligations, they may be being taken advantage of.  
Through the SPC framework, we expect to find a combination of three currencies 
(transactional, relational and ideological) at two different levels: expected Returns and 
expected Obligations. From H1 we anticipate that stakeholders will find a balance between 
overall returns and obligations, however, for H2 we expect each stakeholder to behave 
differently by prioritizing specific currencies within returns and obligations. 
 
o  H2. The currencies of SPCs: Volunteers, employees, and donors will display 
different levels of Relational, Transactional and Ideological currencies within their 
expected Returns and Obligations. 
 
Research on volunteers shows that although mission and value-oriented factors are 
highly relevant (Scheel & Mohr, 2012), close contact and appreciation from their 
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organization are also valued highly (Kappelides, Cuskelly, & Hoye, 2019). This indicates that 
for volunteers, Ideological Obligations and Relational Returns are highly relevant 
(Vantilborgh et al., 2014).  
 
o  H2.A) Volunteers SPCs show Ideological Obligations as being the most 
important, while Relational Returns come second. Transactional Returns, however, 
will be the least relevant. 
 
The main discrepancy between volunteers and employees regarding the PC lies in the 
benefits perceived in exchange for their work, i.e., the Transactional Expectations (Liao-
Troth, 2001). Atkinson (2007) mentions that employees find the Transactional currency 
particularly relevant as if the fulfillment of this currency would enable the creation of a 
Relational one and both of these will have an impact on trust in the employer. Although 
employees, in general, might be more transactional-driven, literature also highlights the 
relevance of the NPOs’ mission in recruiting and retaining human resources, which would 
give high relevance to the Ideological currency (Bingham, 2005; Brown & Yoshioka, 2003), 
however, in a labor market as narrow as the Bolivian, Ideological returns may be irrelevant. 
 
o  H2.B) Employees’ SPCs are balanced, however, Transactional and Relational 
Returns are most important. 
 
NPOs are highly dependent on donors to perform their operations, and donors trust 
organizations to boost their reputation (Ebrahim, 2005). As Stevens and Hauser (2004) 
indicate, donating and cooperating is often driven by future benefits. Since this relationship is 
mainly focused on the spending of money for specific purposes (Lloyd, 2005), we expect that 
donors have high Transactional Obligations while expecting Ideological and Relational 
currencies in exchange.  
 
o  H2.C) Donors’ SPC will show Transactional Obligations, Ideological Returns and 
Relational Returns as being most important; Ideological Obligations are the least 
relevant.  
 
We also intend to assess some outcomes triggered by the SPC currencies in order to 
determine their value creation potential. Satisfaction with the organization was very early 
linked to PCs, as well as satisfaction with a particular aspect (e.g., job satisfaction, supervisor 
satisfaction, etc.) (Tett & Meyer, 1993). Turnover intention in employees has also been 
studied together with PC, (Kotter, 1973), however, Engagement to a cause has not yet been 
addressed through a PC perspective and could help to assess how value is delivered to the 
cause through the NPO (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2014). 
We address global Satisfaction to the NPO as well as the Engagement to the cause, 
both as understood by the stakeholder. We assert that SPC currencies can have different 
priorities for each stakeholder group, but that all currencies have the potential for triggering 
value either for the NPO in the form of Satisfaction or for the cause as Engagement. 
Evidently, we expect Turnover intention to behave opposite from satisfaction and 
engagement.  
 
o  H3.A) The salience of SPCs: All SPC currencies relate positively to Satisfaction 
towards the organization and Engagement towards the cause.  
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o  H3.B) Satisfaction towards the organization and Engagement towards the cause 
will relate negatively to Turnover intention in employees. 
 
The model to be tested for this hypothesis is shown in Figure 1, considering Turnover 
intention is only measured in employees. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Model for testing Hypothesis 3 
 
5. Methodology. Sampling procedure 
 
The Bolivian Ministry of Planning and Development provided a list of current NPOs in 
the country, however, not all of them had running operations at the time of the study. We 
contacted only local NPOs, with managerial presence in the country and with a history of at 
least 5 years. After reaching out to more than 50 Bolivian NPOs fifteen organizations 
responded favorably to participating in the study and from those, 7 distributed the surveys to 
their stakeholders, being volunteers, employees and donors. The missions of these 
organizations are diverse, i.e., animal rights, protection of the elder, housing, children 
protection, young people with special needs, education and women’s rights, the biggest NPO 
had 60 employees on their payroll. Individual participants were contacted through email by 
their organization’s manager or by the researcher on behalf of the organization. The email 
contained an organizational and a personal link to the online survey and emphasized the 
voluntary and anonymous nature of people’s participation. An open link was also published 
through social media at the NPOs’ websites and sent to groups of people who participated in 
volunteer groups and/or had a network of personal donors that participated in fund-raising 
events, thereby increasing our pool of participants.  
Overall, 650 individuals were contacted. We obtained 409 complete and valid 
responses (overall response rate: 63%), out of which 86.5% came from the contacted NPOs. 
251 women and 158 men participated in the study: 271 volunteers, 171 employees and 21 
donors. The donor sample is quite small compared to the other groups in view of further 
statistical analyses, therefore, caution as well as a particular analysis approach is needed. All 
the communications, as well as the survey, were done in Spanish. 
 
6. Variables and Measures 
 
The independent variables measuring SPCs’ expected Returns and Obligations are 
presented in Table 1, dependent variables are included in Table 2. 
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Table 1. Independent Variables 
 
 
 
Table 2. Dependent Variables 
 
 
 
The instrument consists of a questionnaire with four subscales (see Annex 1). SPC 
items were adapted from the scales by Bingham (2005) and Rousseau (2000) and were to be 
answered on a 5-point Likert scale. Expected Returns were measured asking participants to 
rate the statement “As a <stakeholder>, I expect <name of the NPO> to…”. For example, if 
the respondent was a donor for the fire department, it read “As a donor, I expect the Fire 
Department to…”. We provided a list of 8 Relational, 10 Transactional and 9 Ideological 
items. 
In a similar way, we asked to rate Expected Obligations as “The Fire Department can 
expect from me as a donor that I…” and provided a list of 9 Relational, 8 Transactional and 
10 Ideological observed variables.  
For the dependent variables, we developed specific items for this study based on work 
by (Mcdonald & Makin, 2000; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). We asked respondents their 
level of agreement with each statement and provided them with a slider scale from 0 to 100 
as recommended by (Fisher & To, 2012) for single item measurement. Satisfaction to the 
organization (α= 0.945) consisted of: level of satisfaction with the organization, perception of 
the organization's performance and the degree to which their expectations are in line with the 
organization's expectations. Engagement with the cause was measured through a single item 
by asking respondents to rate their level of personal commitment with the cause sponsored by 
the organization. Turnover intention (for employees only) was measured through three items 
as developed by Carmeli and Weisberg (2007), the items stem from the thoughts of quitting 
to the intention to search for another job. Finally, identification variables were included: 
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gender, the duration of the relationship with the organization and the frequency of contact 
with the NPO. 
We first translated and back-translated the survey to Spanish, then run a pilot test using 
a small convenience sample (N= 93) to check comprehensibility and verify internal 
consistency of all subscales through Cronbach alpha coefficients: Expected Returns, 
Relational (RREL α =0.75), Transactional (RTRAα =0.77) and Ideological (RIDE α =0.87); 
Expected Obligations, Relational (EREL α =0.82), Transactional (ETRA α =0.75) and 
Ideological (EIDE α =0.88). 
We performed statistical analyses with SPSS Statistics 25 and STATA 14.2. We 
calculated frequencies, descriptive statistics, internal consistency (reliability), Pearson 
correlations and performed path analyses. Multicollinearity was controlled for when required. 
 
7. Results 
 
In order to check the reliability of the measures in the final sample, we analyzed the 
data for the volunteers, employees and donors separately. Accepting Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients above 0.70 (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013), we found that two items in the SPC had to 
be deleted; Table 3 shows all coefficients. Descriptive measures for each SPC currency can 
be found in table 4.  
 
Table 3. Reliability Statistics. Cronbach's Alpha Coefficient per subscale 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive indicators for SPC 
 
 
 
H1: The composition of SPCs 
 
Returns and Obligations for each group of stakeholders were compared using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon paired t-test (Table 5) since the data is not normally distributed and 
we have a small sample size in donors. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find significantly 
higher Obligations than Returns (p<.01) for volunteers. As expected, employees do not show 
significant differences between these variables, demonstrating balanced SPCs. The same 
happens for donors, where the difference between Obligations and Returns is not significant. 
 Gobernar, 3 (5) July-December // Julio-Diciembre, 2019: 17-42 (ISSN: 2474-2678)                                             
 
26 
Therefore, we can only accept H1 for employees and donors showing a balance between 
Obligations and Returns.  
 
Table 5. Discrepancy measures between Returns and Obligations 
 
 
 
The balance between Obligations and Returns changes slightly when analyzing the 
separate currencies within them. We performed paired sample t-tests in order to compare 
each currency’s Obligations vs. Returns. Table 6 shows this difference of means, where a 
positive outcome indicates higher Obligations and a negative outcome indicates higher 
Returns.  
 
Table 6. Discrepancies between Returns and Obligations per currency 
 
 
 
We find volunteers possess significantly higher Transactional (9.064**) and Relational 
Obligations (7.183**). The impression that employees’ SPCs are balanced is not entirely so, 
as they expect significantly higher Ideological Returns (-3.592**) and hold high 
Transactional Obligations (2.696**). Donors do not show significant differences.  
 
H2: The currencies for each stakeholder  
 
In order to determine the priorities, we performed a one-way ANOVA and a Student T-
test to establish the significance of the difference in means for each of the six currencies, the 
complete results for this analysis can be found in Annex 3. Figure 2 shows that volunteers 
prioritize Ideological Obligations and Returns as much as their Relational Obligations, not 
showing a significant difference between them. As expected, volunteers’ Transactional 
Returns are significantly lower than all other currencies (p<0.01). The results provide partial 
support for H2.A, especially when prioritizing the cause they contribute to, above economical 
rewards. 
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Figure 2. The priority of currencies for Volunteers 
 
For employees, we do not find significant consecutive differences between currencies, 
however, we find two distinct priorities, where they expect more Ideological than 
Transactional Returns. Contrary to H2.B, we find employees hold even higher Transactional 
Obligations than Returns. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The priority of currencies for Employees 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The priority of currencies for Donors 
 
Finally, among donors, we find a surprisingly balanced SPC. And though there are no 
significant differences between each consecutive currency, we do find a marginal gap 
between the highest and lowest currency, this leads us to reject H2.C.  
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H3: The salience of SPCs 
 
In this section, we used path analysis to identify if all SPC currencies relate 
significantly to Engagement with the cause, Satisfaction to the Organization and Turnover 
Intention (the latter only for employees). We will address the initial model as Model A. As 
Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, and Paxton (2008) recommend, we use multiple statistical 
measures to test the fit of the model, chi-square (p> .05), RMSEA (p> .05), Tucker-Lewis 
index (p> .08) and SRMR (p<.05).  
As seen in table 7 we first tested Model A, however, this did not yield adequate indexes 
for all stakeholder groups. We decided to delete the direction with the least significant p-
value and the model was run again until we found a fit for each group. In some cases, this 
resulted in the deletion of the entire observed variable. The original z-coefficients and p-
values for Model A and the Final Model can be found in Annex 4, while the values regarding 
model fit can be found in Table 6. 
 
Table 7. Result of the Model coefficients in Model A vs. Final Model 
 
 
 
We first elaborate on the results for volunteers and employees. For volunteers, we 
found that Ideological Obligations has a significantly positive relation with both Satisfaction 
to the NPO (β=.33, z=4.64, p<.01) and Engagement with the cause (β=.28, z=3.31, p<.01), 
while Transactional Obligations has a significantly negative relation with Satisfaction to the 
NPO (β=-.18, z=-2.68, p<.05) and no impact on Engagement with the cause (Figure 6). It is 
not a surprise to find a positive covariance between Satisfaction to the NPO and Engagement 
with the cause of (cov=.516, z=11.51, p<.01).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Final Model for Volunteers 
 
For employees, we also find Ideological Obligations positively related both to 
Satisfaction to the NPO (β=.39, z=3.91 p<.05) and Engagement with the cause (β=.24, 
z=2.72, p<.01) (Figure 7). While Ideological Returns shows a negative effect on Satisfaction 
to the NPO (β=-.33, z=3.67, p<.01). After testing Satisfaction as a mediating variable 
according to the model proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986), we confirmed that it indeed 
has a mediating effect between Engagement with the cause and Turnover intention which 
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indicates that more satisfied employees are, the less likely to leave the organization (β=-.52, 
z=-7.31, p<.01).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Final Model for Employees 
 
Due to the small sample size, it is not possible to estimate the entire model at once for 
donors, therefore we estimated Returns and Obligations separately. Despite having a good 
model fit, we did not find significant relationships between currencies and the dependent 
variables. After modeling Returns, we eliminated the Transactional Returns component, due 
to no significant relationship with the outcome variables.  
When modeling Obligations in donors, we found that none of the components had 
significant p-values. Therefore, we took the Returns model and added the Obligations 
variables one by one in order to observe any possible impact this may have on the variability 
of the model. The final outcome, to be treated with caution, shows a significantly negative 
relationship of Relational Returns with Satisfaction to the NPO (β=-.54, z=2.99, p<.01) as 
well as with Engagement with the cause (β=-.52, z=-2.26, p<.01) (Figure 8). Ideological 
Obligations shows a significant effect on Engagement with the cause (β=.47, z=2.85, p<.01) 
as Relational Obligations over Satisfaction to the NPO (β=.45 z=2.34, p<.05). 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Final Model for Donors 
 
8. Discussion 
 
In developing economies as the Bolivian, managers tend to neglect stakeholders by 
prioritizing financers or donors above others such as employees working at ground level 
(Ebrahim, 2005). Previous research in the Bolivian non-profit context has focused either in 
the socio-political environment (Bebbington, 2004), the psychological factors that influence 
beneficiaries (Losantos, Berckmans, Villanueva, & Loots, 2014) or most recently, on touristic 
volunteering (Thompson, Curran, & Gorman, 2017). However, the challenges of NPOs in the 
face of changing legislation and decreasing funding are hardly addressed, especially for local 
NPOs who lack institutional leverage in front of the imposition of international development 
institutions (Arellano-Lopez & Petras, 1994). As international funding gets relocated to low-
income countries, Bolivian NPOs need to compete for citizens’ credibility to retain their staff 
and keep their volunteers engaged.  
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In order to give value to stakeholders, managers need to fulfill their expectations, and 
this may mean focusing on different currencies for each stakeholder. In this paper we aim to 
identify the currencies that Bolivian stakeholders value from the relationship with an NPO. 
Through SPCs, we were able to classify expected returns and obligations from volunteers, 
employees, and donors towards several Bolivian NPOs and the emerging outcomes of each of 
these currencies.  
 
8.1 Volunteers 
 
We were able to confirm that Volunteers show more expected Obligations than 
Returns. This positive imbalance comes from highly regarded Relational and Transactional 
Obligations; volunteers perceive their relationship and their feelings of belonging to the NPO 
is their own responsibility and they are willing to uphold the NPOs’ image and reputation 
even beyond their agreement.  
However, we found that volunteers’ Ideological component is the highest ranked for 
this group of stakeholders, but their expected Returns and Obligations do not have the same 
effects. In line with previous research (Scheel & Mohr, 2012) their Obligations will generate 
engagement with the cause and satisfaction with the organization. Vantilborgh and cols. 
(2016) encounter for this group, when organizations ask too much from volunteers, in our 
case in the shape of Transactional Obligation (e.g. fees to participate in volunteering 
activities), Satisfaction with the NPO decreases, while providing support and supervision 
encourages them to participate more. 
When volunteers feel the need to contribute to a cause and engage in it, they rank their 
own Transactional Returns as their lowest priority, which indicates they are the least 
demanding stakeholders. On the other hand, when volunteers do not have the resources or the 
conditions to perform their tasks, and they feel they need to take the lead in establishing the 
specific aspects of their relationship, value to the organization is being drained.  
The lack of a relational currency driving Satisfaction with the NPO does not negate the 
conclusions drawn by Vantilborgh et al. (2011), stating that friendship is key, however, it 
signals the likelihood that the Bolivian NPOs are merely an enabler of volunteers finding this 
currency in peers or beneficiaries.  
 
8.2 Employees 
 
For employees, we find a balance between Returns and Obligations as expected. 
Surprisingly, we find higher Transactional Obligations than Returns, although the initiative 
for setting the transactional agreement generally comes from the employer. Employees 
themselves, in this case, are keen on setting the intentions and acting according to their 
responsibilities in their employment agreements, perhaps due to the need to retain their 
income in a limited job market as the Bolivian. 
We also find that employees for Bolivian NPOs expect from the organization to 
contribute to the cause and engage with it more than they do themselves. We find a balance in 
the Relational currency, where employees show concern about the NPO’s reputation and 
image and also expect to receive appreciation for their efforts and their wellbeing, even 
beyond the professional exchange, in line with general PC research (Aykan, 2014; Coyle-
Shapiro & Kessler, 2002; Morrison & Robinson, 1997).  
Although Ideological Obligations is not employees’ first priority, Satisfaction to the 
organization is mainly related to this component, as is their Engagement with the cause. 
While Ideological returns seem to have an opposite effect on Satisfaction with the 
organization. Based on (Ebrahim, 2005), we contemplate the possibility that employees 
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perceive they may need to compromise their own well-being when the organization engages 
more towards the main cause. Further, Bingham (2005) and Brown and Yoshioka (2003) 
already noticed the importance of the ideological currency at the moment of recruiting and 
retaining employees. Our results highlight the importance of sponsoring a cause and allowing 
employees to contribute actively and getting a sense of reward from their duties. This is 
probably the relationship where most value is exchanged between NPO and Stakeholder, as 
they reciprocally exchange relational aspects and the ideological salience delivers value to the 
cause. 
Despite observing a high correlation between Engagement with the cause and Turnover 
intention, the final model for employees suggests that Satisfaction to the organization is a key 
mediator for employees’ intention to leave the organization, which means that no matter how 
engaged an employee is to the cause, when they are unsatisfied with the organization, they 
will look for another job, even if this means stopping their contribution to the cause in line 
with Tnay, Othman, Siong, and Lim (2013).  
 
8.3 Donors 
 
In the case of donors, our sample size does not allow us to draw definitive conclusions. 
However, results showed a balanced SPC between Returns and Obligations, as well as among 
currencies, where we only found a marginal significance where Ideological Obligations were 
found to be slightly more relevant than Relational Returns. This may be because donors get 
involved very narrowly with the NPO, as Townsend and Townsend (2004) state, not all 
donors receive the accountability reports NPOs make, and sometimes they limit their 
involvement to eventual donations.  
As for the outcomes of donors’ SPCs, we find Relational Returns to associate 
negatively with Engagement with the cause and with Satisfaction to the NPO. This indicates 
that the more an NPO tries to engage the donor, the less satisfied the donor becomes. 
Contrary to this, Relational Obligations indicates higher levels of Satisfaction to the NPO, 
suggesting donors perceive more value when they control the relationship and they can 
contribute to the NPO with their own ideas. Finally, we find that Bolivian donors Engage 
further in a cause when they see NPOs contributing to it, advocating in its favor and 
encouraging others to get involved. In this case, value emerges from a relational exchange 
and multiplies towards the cause when the NPO is fully committed. Value arrives at the NPO 
when the donor can control its involvement and is given the opportunity to contribute to the 
cause.  
 
9. Conclusions and further research 
 
The concept of PC can be adapted to a stakeholder perspective in order to give an 
operationalization of how each stakeholder might create value for the cause. Being the first 
study to compare different NPO stakeholders through one research framework, we show that 
a single model does not hold for all stakeholders since the salience of the currencies changes 
among different stakeholders. We were able to see that the creation of value is both an 
expectation from the stakeholder, as well as an opportunity to contribute to a cause. 
However, our study is not without limitations, and sampling is probably the most 
important one. As our sample was not randomly selected, and only limited to three 
stakeholders, we may have incurred a self-selection bias by having NPOs that are already 
quite attentive to their stakeholders being the most interested in participating. Also, because 
of sample size, we cannot generalize these results to all volunteers, employees, and donors 
from all Bolivian NPOs, nor the causality of the relationships found because of our cross-
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sectional model. Nevertheless, the importance of ideological obligations for all Bolivian NPO 
stakeholders cannot be ignored.  
Important to emphasize that we did not measure SPC fulfillment, therefore we cannot 
conclude that certain expectations are fulfilled or breached, this might be tackled in future 
research. But we do offer a comparable overview of different stakeholders’ value 
appropriation from their relationship with their NPO.  
Our application of SPC shows that a myriad of opportunities exists to shed light on the 
implicit expectations that contribute to other outcomes that we did not consider here. Our 
results also lead us to question the limit of volunteers’ engagement and the outcomes 
associated with volunteers’ expected obligations.  
In line with Brown and Yoshioka (2003), we find satisfaction to the NPO and 
engagement with the cause positively associated both in volunteers and. However, since 
satisfaction mediates turnover intention in employees, it could also have an effect on the 
permanence of other stakeholders. 
In a context where funding challenges and limitations can be used to restrict payroll and 
avoid providing employees with proper working conditions, the results showing higher 
employees’ Transactional Obligations than Returns lead us to question whether they feel 
compelled to make transactional sacrifices. The fact that they would have to take initiatives to 
fulfill their agreements, can also signal employee neglect on behalf of management, which 
can be focusing their attention to funders above employees.  
In the case of donors, it seems relevant to further study the Relational currencies, as it 
appears that when donors take the lead in the relationship, they can be more satisfied with the 
NPO they contribute to. However, we only considered personal donors, and only two of the 
NPOs in our sample rely on these stakeholders. Most Bolivian NPOs depend greatly in 
corporate donors and international cooperation, who may have a different impact on NPO 
management, especially in influencing their focus on certain development plans.  
Finally, we provide an important step towards mapping several stakeholder’s 
expectations. We anticipate SPC can be applied with other NPO stakeholders such as 
governments, society, and beneficiaries. The reciprocity cycle would not be finished without 
getting the perspective of the NPO and its agents, namely, managers and employees who act 
on behalf of the NPO towards other stakeholders and who actually face contradictory 
expectations. By mapping out all parties’ expected returns and obligations we may actually 
be able to appreciate how the cycle of reciprocity and value appropriation works in a ‘full’ 
stakeholder network.  
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11. Annexes 
 
11.1a SPC Survey in Spanish as applied to the sample 
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11.1b SPC Survey in English 
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11.2. Correlation coefficients between all variables per group of stakeholders  
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11.3 ANOVA Paired T-test between all currencies, results per group 
 
  
11.4 Coefficients for all variables in Model A and Final Model 
 
  
